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I. Introduction 
This talk is technically entitled Joint Operating Agreement Issues. The 
title was an attempt by those behind the presentation of this year's Mineral 
Law Institute to provide subject matter that was sufficiently broad to allow 
the speaker to delve into selected areas covered by standard operating 
agreements. Accordingly, we will delve into the various ways operations 
are conducted between mineral producers involved in "Joint Exploration 




A term used "to describe the situation ofajointly owned lease or block 
ofacreage which contemplates the exploration and drilling ofmultiple 
wells, each party paying for its own costs and being entitled to its 
pro 
rata share of income and operating expenses. Thisjointform ofoil and 
gas activity is primarilyconductedvia theform ofa joint operating 
agreement'.. ." [Emphasis added.] 
8 Williams & Meyers, p. 540. 
As the authors correctly point out, because of the risk involved, these 
activities are generally conducted under the auspices of a joint operating 
agreement. When they are not, it is often the result ofa failure of the parties 
to agree on one because of competition in the area or some other like 
reason. We will later address the problems that might arise because of the 
failure to enter into a joint exploration or operating agreement. 
Joint Operating Agreement is defined as follows: 
An agreement between or among interested parties for the operation of 
a tract or leasehold for oil, gas and other minerals. This type of 
agreement is frequently entered into before there has been any 
development. Typically the agreement provides for the development 
of the premises by one of the parties for the joint account. The parties 
to the agreement share in the expenses of the operations and in the 
proceeds ofdevelopment, but the agreementnormally is not intended 
to 
affect 
the ownership of the mineralsor the rights to produce, in 
which respects, among others,thejoint operatingagreementis to be 
distinguishedfrom a unitization agreement and from a mining 
partnership.A joint operation may be carried on by a variety of means 
other than by a joint operating agreement, including the following: 
joint adventure, partnership, corporation or trust. [Emphasis added.] 
8 Williams 
& 
Meyers, p. 541. 
As indicated, the result of ajoint operating agreement is the creation of 
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a joint account that constitutes the funds available for the payment of 
obligations and that is amassed by the collection of money both by 
contributions from the parties and through the collection of proceeds from 
production in those cases where the operator does marketing. Note that 
under the agreement referenced by Williams & Meyers, lease ownership 
remains separate. 
Operations to conduct exploration for minerals are often conducted 
under a written form of joint operating agreement developed for onshore 
operations by the American Association of Petroleum Landmen, (latest 
revision being Form 610-1989). In Louisiana, such an agreement must be 
in writing because it deals with the operation of mineral leases. Hayes v. 
Muller,245 La. 356, 158 So.2d 191 (1963). Thejoint operating agreement 
is designed to set forth the rules under which the property will be developed 
and how the parties will share income going forward in the venture. 
Inasmuch as there are legal relationships that would naturally cause certain 
duties to arise, the content of this agreement is important. This paper will 
follow and discuss the format of the current standard form joint operating 
agreement and discuss case law affecting particular areas covered by such 
agreements. 
II. The Joint Operating Agreement 
The AAPL Form 610-1989 is designed in a format that covers the 
basic necessities of operations and in some instances provides multiple 
choice or fill-in the blank options that create elections to accommodate 
specific needs or preferences. 
A. Article I - "Definitions" 
The first section of the standard form operating agreement defines 
certain terms that are used and applied in the agreement. While seemingly 
terms are often self-defining to those who are familiar with oil and gas 
operations, one should nevertheless pay special attention to these terms and 
take pains to apply them consistently in any additions to the agreement as 
well as in any other writings dealing with or affecting the area covered by 
the agreement. Where necessary, one should also add additional definitions 
of terms of art. If a party is ever called upon to ask a court to decide the 
meaning of certain provisions of the joint operating agreement, farmout 
agreement, or any side letter, the court will pay close attention to how these 
terms are defined. 
In a lawsuit about oil and gas matters such as these, more times than 
not the court will not have any experience with oil and gas matters, and 
these terms of art and will mean absolutely nothing to the court except 
insofar they are defined in the contract or in normal use. Recognizing these 
types of situations, Civil Code article 2047 provides that: "The words of a 
contract must be given their generally prevailing meaning. Words of art 
and technical terms must be given their technical meaning when the contract 
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involves a technical matter." This Code article will likely allow parol 
evidence about customary meanings in the industry, which means that a 
potential swearing match may develop among experts as to the meaning of 
terms. 
To illustrate the point, reference is made to decision by Judge Clement 




ExplorationCo. v. Unocal Corporation,863 F. Supp. 
306 (1994). There, the court struggled with terms of art used in a mineral 
instrument (in this case, a lease). The questions presented were 
(1)
whether 
the term "value" in the royalty section providing that LL&E was to receive 
27-1/2 percent of the value of liquid hydrocarbons was ambiguous and 
would require parol testimony, including testimony of an industry expert, 
and (2) whether the phrase "premiums or allowances" was ambiguous in the 
context ofwhether gathering charge reimbursements would be construed as 
allowances. In each case, the lawyers for LL&E argued forcefully that the 
terms were clear and unambiguous while the lawyers for Unocal argued that 
they were subject to special meaning in the industry which required further 
explanation. The court split on the two terms, saying the first was 
ambiguous and called for testimony of"professionals in the industry" as to 
the meaning of the word "value." However, no testimony was allowed on 
the meaning of the phrase "premiums or allowances" as section 110 of the 
NGPA, which allowed the gathering charge reimbursement, characterized 
the charge as an "allowance." Thus, in this instance, the court was able to 
locate a statutory definition. The sum and substance is that the courts, who 
do not deal with these concepts on a day-to-day basis, will not naturally 
adopt assumed industry definitions. 
Even terms which are used that are commonplace and seemingly well-
defined in the industry can be made subject to interpretation precisely 
because they are specialized industry terms. If the drafter is not careful to 
define terms and use them accordingly, an unintended meaning may be 
attached to the terminology even where the drafter assumes that the other 
contracting parties understand the terminology. For that reason, it is very 
important to use consistent terminology in all of the documents that both 
lead up to and more particularly, are employed in subsequent agreements, 
because conflicting definitions in earlier or later documents can be used to 
modify or define the rights and obligations of the agreement. Likewise, 
where appropriate the drafter should always take the trouble to fully define 
specialized industry terminology. 
B. Article II -"Exhibits" 
The "Exhibits" section of the joint operating agreement calls for 
supplementation of the main body of the agreement with those exhibits 
frequently attached to the agreement. Certain of the proposed attachments 
are commonly used and are significant. Those familiar with these 
agreements know that Exhibit "A" is in many ways more important than 
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any provision in the body of the agreement. Exhibit "A" will define the 
lands and leases that are subject to the agreement, the percentage of 
ownership before and after payout of the participants, and other burdens 
that might exist against the leases covered by the agreement. In conjunction 
with Article III ofthe Joint Operating Agreement, Exhibit "A" will define 
the basis upon which expenses will be charged and revenues will be 
disbursed. Obviously, errors in Exhibit "A" could have drastic implications 
in the event that a third party was to rely upon the recorded agreement or an 
extract of the agreement.' 
Exhibit "C" is styled "Accounting Procedure" and will generally 
contain the currently effective procedures developed by the Counsel of 
Petroleum Accountants Societies ("COPAS"), which will define how and 
when the charges to the joint account can be made as well as how and upon 
what basis credits will be given. Exhibit "E",Gas Balancing Agreement, is 
an optional attachment. There has been quite a bit if controversy 
throughout the industry about gas balancing in recent years (discussed 
briefly below). The gas balancing agreement is an optional attachment, but 
it is sufficiently important that the Louisiana Supreme Court has made 
reference to the fact that the one who does not enter into a gas balancing 
agreement either in connection with the joint operating agreement or 
otherwise does so at his or her own peril.2 
C. Article III - "Interest of the Parties" 
Article III, "Interest of the Parties", contains three sub-sections. 
Section III(A), "Oil and Gas Interests," deals with the situation in which one 
of the participants in the joint operating agreement also owns a fee interest. 
It determines how the fee interest will be treated. This Section is obviously 
of limited importance. 
By contract, Section III(B) is almost universally important. It is an 
adjunct to Exhibit "A" of the joint operating agreement and it essentially 
establishes that the costs and liabilities incurred in operations under the 
operating agreement shall be borne, and all equipment and material shall be 
owned, as the parties' interests are set forth in Exhibit "A." Similarly, it 
states that all oil and gas production from the contract area shall be owned 
1 LSA-R.S. 9:2731 etseq. provide that a joint operating agreement will be effective as 
to third parties and establish a procedure by which third parties may be bound by the 
recordation of a declaration in lieu of the filing ofthe entire agreement. 
2 In its opinion denying relief to owners seeking cash balancing in lieu of in kind 
balancing, the Louisiana Supreme Court declared: 
The owners could easily have entered into a gas balancing agreement or inserted a provision 
addressing the issue of imbalances in a joint operating agreement. The owners involved 
in 
the instant case failed to do so, despite the existence of case law and commentary which 
clearly demonstrates that owners not covered by a joint operating agreement or a gas 
balancing agreement proceed at their own peril. 
Hunt Oil Co. v. Batchelor,644 So.2d 191 at 204-5 (La. 1994). 
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by the parties as their interest is set forth in Exhibit "A." Section III(B) also 
has a provision indicating that no party to the operating agreement shall 
ever be responsible on a price basis to any other party's lessor or royalty 
owner for a price higher than the price received by that party. In other 
words, if the price for products sold under the operating agreement is below 
what is owed under the mineral lease, then the party who contributed the 
mineral lease to the joint operations shall bear the additional royalty. 
Finally, this section states that the method ofjointly operating these mineral 
interests does not establish a cross-conveyance of the mineral leases 
covered by the agreement. Rather, the parties continue with their separate 
ownership rights and obligations. The net effect of this is that if there 
is 
going to be joint ownership of the leases under the agreement, that will 
occur by virtue of ancillary agreements such as farmouts, subleases, 
or 
assignments. 
Section III(C) of the operating agreement simply establishes that if 
a 
party creates additional burdens against a lease that has been contributed to 
the joint operating agreement, that party shall bear the additional burdens. 
The other parties are not responsible for it. It further establishes that any 
subsequently created interests shall be subject to those operators and non-
operators' liens, which are established in Article VII of the joint operating 
agreement. Obviously, this would only be effective to the extent that one 
has properly recorded the joint operating agreement or a memorandum 
of 
operating agreement, which would put third parties who receive the 
subsequently created interest on notice of the agreements, restrictions, 
obligations and lien provisions. 
D. Article IV - "Titles" 
Article IV deals with "Titles." Section IV(A) is the "Title 
examination" provision: "Title examination shall be made on the Drillsite 
of any proposed well prior to commencement ofdrilling operations and in 
the event the Drilling Parties so request or Operator so elects, title 
examination shall be made on the entire Drilling Unit, or maximum 
anticipated Drilling Unit, of the well." Title examination is therefore 
mandatory for the drillsite on any well, and it is mandatory on the entire 
unit where a party requests it. Inasmuch as this is a mandatory provision, 
in 
the event that the operator fails to obtain 
a 
title examination, and title proves 
defective, the failure to obtain a title examination could conceivably 
constitute gross negligence on the part of the operator under Article V and 
cause the operator to be liable for the loss of the interest that could have 
been corrected by title curative work. Additionally, this failure could 
constitute a violation of the agreement and might make the operator liable 
for breach of contract even 
if 
the loss were not deemed to be the result of 
gross negligence. 
These mandatory provisions provide serious legal responsibility 
questions that have not yet been resolved by the courts. This paper will 
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discuss below the problems courts have had in applying the gross 
negligence standard to the actions of the operator in particular contexts, and 
those discussions will apply to each situation in which the operator is given 
a mandatory directive such as this one. In the author's view, the Article V 
standard should be applied to all activities conducted under the operating 
agreement by the operator such that the court should be compelled to find 
a 
breach of the agreement, and then find it to be as a result gross negligence 
or willful misconduct before awarding damages, but this has not always 
been done. 
Section IV(A) further states that: "No well shall be drilled on the 
Contract Area until after 
(1) 
the title to the Drillsite or Drilling Unit, if 
appropriate, has been examined as above provided, and 
(2)
the title has been 
approved by the examining attorney or title has been accepted by all of the 
Drilling Parties in such well." Again, this is mandatory. An operator needs 
approved title opinions or waivers on the drillsite (and potentially the entire 
unit) before any well is drilled. This could present a serious problem 
if 
drilling operations are begun before the title opinion and curative work are 
complete. 
Section IV(B) deals with "Loss or Failure of Title." It is fairly 
comprehensive and provides that each party bears the burden of loss ofany 
lease contributed by that party. Section VII(E) of the operating agreement, 
which calls for the party who contributed the leases to pay rentals, dovetails 
with this provision, so that the contributing party will protect that party's 
own leases. Often the operator will undertake to cure title, maintain leases 
and pay royalties, thereby confusing the respective duties of the parties. 
Any loss of title caused by the operator would presumably place the parties 
proportionately at risk, subject to whatever rights might be available against 
the operator under Article V.' 
3 In Huggs, Inc. v. LPCEnergy,Inc., 889 F.2d 649 (5th Cir. 1989), the Fifth Circuit, 
Judge John Duhe, applying Louisiana law, was faced with a situation in which LPC, an 
operator, failed to pay delay rentals and lost two leases and let two others within a unit 
expire because they ceased producing and lapsed without an attempt either to maintain them 
by further operations, delay rentals, or assignment to the other participants, who would then 
be in a position to maintain the leases. The court found that the leases lost because of the 
failure to pay delay rentals did not warrant compensation because the applicable agreements 
excused the operator from liability from mistake or oversight in connection with the 
payment of delay rentals. However, with respect to those leases lost because they were not 
maintained by drilling operations or delay rentals, and were not assigned, the court found 
that the operator had committed gross negligence, had violated the duty expected of 
a 
prudent operator and as respects a third party overriding royalty owner committed a tort. 
There is no mention of the fact that gross negligence was stipulated as a standard in this case 
nor does it appear that a funding of such was either necessary or outcome determinative. 
Such a finding would certainly not be justify under the definition of gross negligence 
established by the 
jurisprudence, 
i.e., "the want of even slight care ... the want of that 
diligence which even careless men are accustomed to exercise." State v. Vinzant, 
7 
So.2d 
917, 200 La. 301 (La. 1942); First
Commonwealth 
Corp. v. HiberniaNat. Bank ofNew 
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Section IV(B) provides that in the event of loss ofa lease there will be 
no retroactive adjustment development costs nor operating expenses nor of 
revenues. However, where the contributing party has paid up drilling costs 
in a producing well there will be a reimbursement of those costs from 
production. There are also provisions establishing that 
if 
a contributing 
party or anyone acting on behalf of a contributing party acquires a lease 
interest within ninety (90) days of loss, the acquisition is attributed to the 
initial contributing party. This again dovetails with Section 
E
of VII of the 
operating agreement, which addresses the effect of the lost acreage on the 
contributing party or the joint account. 
E. Article 
V -
"Designation and Responsibilities of Operator" 
Article V of the operating agreement is the article that establishes the 
rights and duties of the operator. Section 
A 
talks about designation and 
responsibility of the operator, requires that the parties name the operator, 
and states that the operator shall "conduct and direct and have full control of 
all operations on the Contract Area as permitted and required by, and within 
the limits of this agreement." It also provides that the operator shall be an 
independent contractor, that the operator will not be or hold itself out as 
"agent" ofnon-operators, and that the operator "shall not have the authority 
to bind" the non-operators "to any obligation or liability assumed 
or 
incurred by Operator as to any third party." It further states that the 
operator must conduct its activities in a reasonably prudent manner 
in 
accordance with good oilfield practice and in compliance with applicable 
law and regulation, but goes on to provide that "in no event shall [the 
operator]have any liability as operator to the otherpartiesfor losses 
sustainedor liabilities incurred except such as may result from gross 
negligenceor willful misconduct. " Article III of the operating agreement 
provides that the costs and liabilities under the operating agreement will be 
shared by the parties in accordance with their percentages. Thus, "losses 
sustained" here would seem to include all costs and liabilities expended for 
the joint account and would thereby subject all of the joint account 
expenditures to the gross negligence/willful misconduct standard. 
Similarly, the reference to "liabilities incurred" would have the same effect 
with respect to third-party liability, whether it be in tort or contract, for so 
long as it relates to joint operations. 
There is a spectrum of standards of care which, 
if 
applied properly,
should provide the rules by which one's conduct will be judged. The least 
burdensome to the actor is gross negligence or willful misconduct which 
properly applied, are practically equivalent. Gross negligence is defined as 
"the want of even slight care and diligence, it is the want of that diligence 
Orleans, 891 F. Supp. 290, amended 896 F. Supp. 634 (E.D. La. 1995) aff'd, 5 F. 3d 622 
(5th Cir. 1996). 
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which even careless people are accustomed to exercising." Alternatively, it 
is defined as fault which proceeds from inexcusable neglect or ignorance 
by Louisiana Civil Code article 3506(13). Next is normal negligence which 
is conduct which falls below the standard established by law for the protection 
of others against an "unreasonable risk of harm."' Next would be 
a 
fiduciary duty, pursuant to which one owes the highest degree of care and 
cannot place one's own interest above that of the party to whom the duty 
is 
owed.6 While one might anticipate that problems might occur around the 
edges of those standards, the courts have had the most trouble determining 
when to apply which standard, even in view of the stipulation stating that 
the operator will be liable only for those losses sustained by gross fault.' 
The appropriate standard for judging the operator's conduct -- gross 
negligence 
--
has sometimes been blurred as courts look to the relationship 
formed by the joint operating agreement. 
Fiduciary Duties and Third-Party Contractual Liability 
There has been quite a lot of litigation over the issue of whether the 
joint operating agreement confers partnership orjoint venture status.' If the 
assignment asserted is a partnership or joint venture, the participants may 
owe each other heightened standards ofconduct, i.e. fiduciary obligations. 
Louisiana Civil Code article 2801 defines partnership as follows: 
Art. 2801. Partnership; definition. 
A
partnership is ajuridical person, distinct from its partners, created by 
a contract between two or more persons to combine their efforts or 
resources in determined proportions and to collaborate at mutual risk 
for their common profit or commercial benefit. 
Trustees and succession representatives, in their capacities as such, and 
unincorporated associations may be partners. 
Louisiana Civil Code article 2809 provides: 
4 State v. Vinzant, 7 So.2d 917, 200 La. 301 (La. 1942); First Commonwealth Corp. v. 
Hibernia Nat. Bank ofNew Orleans, 891 F. Supp. 290, amended 896 F. Supp. 634 (E.D. La. 
1995) aff'd, 
5 
F. 3d 622 (5th Cir. 1996), Huggs, Inc. v. LPC Energy, Inc., 889 F.2d 649 (5th 
Cir. 1989). 
5
Gross v. Exxon Corp., 885 F. Supp. 899 (M.D. La. 1994). 
6 Grand Isle Campsites, Inc. v. Cheek, 262 La. 
5, 
262 So.2d 350 (1972). 
7 Louisiana Civil Code article 2004 provides, in part, that: "any clause is null that, 
in advance, excludes or limits the liability ofone party for intentional or gross fault that causes 
damage to the other party." This clause does not contradict the stipulation that limits 
liability for either slight fault or normal negligence, and this the limitation of liability for 
those losses caused by anything other than gross negligence or willful misconduct should be 
applied globally to those acts governed by the operating agreement. 
8 
Joint ventures are generally governed by the same rules as a partnership. Cajun Elec. 
Power Coop., Inc. v. McNamara, 452 So.2d 212 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1984). The difference 
is that the joint venture is generally for a limited duration or purpose. Riddle v. Simmons, 589 
So.2d 89 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 592 So.2d 1316 (1992). 
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Art. 2809. Fiduciary duty; activities prejudicial to the partnership. 
A partner owes a fiduciary duty to the partnership and to his partners. 
He may not conduct any activity, for himself or on behalf of a third 
person, that is contrary to his fiduciary duty and is prejudicial to the 
partnership. If he does so, he must account to the partnership and to 
his partners for the resulting profits. 
Louisiana Civil Code articles 2814-2816 read as follows: 
Art. 2814. Partner as mandatary of the partnership. 
A partner is a mandatary of the partnership for all matters in the 
ordinary course of its business other than the alienation, lease, or 
encumbrance of its immovables. A provision that a partner is not a 
mandatary does not affect third persons who in good faith transact 
business with the partner. Except as provided in the articles of 
partnership, any person authorized to execute a mortgage or security 
agreement on behalf of a partnership shall, for purposes ofexecutory 
process, have authority to execute a confession of judgment in the act 
ofmortgage or security agreement without execution of the articles of 
partnership by authentic act. 
Art. 2815. Effect of loss stipulation on third persons. 
A provision that a partner shall not participate in losses does not affect 
third persons. 
Art. 2816. Contract by partner in his own name; effect on the 
partnership. 
An obligation contracted for the partnership by a partner in his own 
name binds the partnership if the partnership benefits by the 
transaction or the transaction involves matters in the ordinary course of 
its business. If the partnership is so bound, it can enforce the contract 
in its own name. 
As can be seen, the significance of the partnership or joint venture 
finding is that partners or joint venturers are fiduciaries who owe one 
another the highest degree of care in the transaction of the affairs of the 
entity. GrandIsle Campsites, Inc. v. Cheek, 262 La. 
5, 
262 So.2d 350 
(1972). Inasmuch as the entity seems to fit the classical definition of 
a partnership, litigation has arisen involving both third party liability and the 
liability of the partners interse. Historically, under the case law the courts 
looked at the nature of the venture and identified it as what it appeared to 
be, and in doing so, often ignored self-serving language in the document 
trying to negate the existence of a partnership. Joint operating agreements 
have typically contained language to the effect that they are not to be 
construed as creating partnerships or joint venturers. As demonstrated 
in 
the decisions discussed below, joint operating agreement participants are 
generally at arms' length, do not require special protection, and thus the 
courts will not be inclined to find those fiduciary duties generally arising 
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from partnership or joint venturer status. In a Colorado case styled Dime 
Box Petroleum Corp. v. LouisianaLandandExplorationCo., 717 F. Supp. 
717 (D. Co. 1989); aff'd938 F.2d 1144 (10th Cir. 1991), Dime Box, a non-
operator, claimed that LL&E, the operator, owed a fiduciary duty and was 
liable because it obtained some purchasing advantages that it did not share 
with the venture. The court found that this was an area in which a fiduciary 
relationship could conceivably be imposed, but because the parties were 
both sophisticated and of equal bargaining rank, because the operating 
agreement had disavowed a joint undertaking, and because the parties had 
specifically stated that the measure ofoperator's liability would be "gross 
negligence or willful misconduct," the court found there was no joint 
venture and no fiduciary relationship. 
In Caddo Oil Co., Inc. v. O'Brien, 908 F.2d 13 (5th Cir. 1990), 
O'Brien claimed that Caddo, as operator, owed a fiduciary duty and an 
accounting. The accounting obligation would effectively have shifted the 
burden from O'Brien to disprove the correctness of operating charges, to 
Caddo, who would have to account for and justify all charges. The court 
held: 
O'Brien is incorrect. Caddo was under no duty to provide O'Brien 
with an accounting. Rather, the onus was on O'Brien to conduct an 
audit if he believed one necessary. Under the terms of the Operating 
Agreement, the Operator is liable to the Owners only in cases of the 
Operator's willful misconduct. The terms of the Operating Agreement 
control, and Caddo's actions are to be judged by a prudent operator 
standard, not by that of a fiduciary. 
Id.at 17. It seems clear that the operation of the agreement is such that the 
parties will act at arms' length, and the duty will be that set forth in the 
operating agreement, not the more stringent duty owed by a fiduciary. 
The other aspect of a finding ofpartnership or joint venture status, is 
that such a finding would call for liability of the non-operators as partners 
or joint venturers for obligations contracted by the operator. In this area, 
the courts have been more inclined to ignore self-serving stipulations and 
analyze the venture based upon how it is structured rather than what the 
parties choose to call it.' Thus, in Posey 
v. 
Fargo, 187 La. 122, 174 So. 
175 (La. 1937); Duncan 
v. 
Gill,227 So.2d 376 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1969), 
cert.denied,255 La. 338, 230 So.2d 834 and cert. denied,397 U.S. 1074, 
25 L. Ed. 2d 809 (1970); and Young v. Reed, 192 So. 780 (La. App. 2d Cir. 
1939), the courts have held that joint oil and gas operations constituted 
a 
joint venture causing liability of all participants to third parties. It follows 
that an agreement to jointly operate leases could be construed as a joint 
venture or partnership under these principles of Louisiana law, creating 
joint liability to third persons in spite of the stipulation to the contrary 
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contained in the operating agreement. 
Fortunately, this problem has been obviated by the enactment of 
Mineral Code article 215, which provides: 
A written contract for the joint exploration, development, or operation 
of mineral rights does not create a partnership unless the contract 
expressly so provides. 
There is no case law applying the article, but it obviously specifically 
addresses the joint operating agreement situation and negates the existence 
of a partnership (or joint venture), absent a specific declaration creating the 
partnership. 
A related avenue for liability to third-parties would seem to be via 
mandate or apparent authority. The model joint operating agreement 
contains a specific disclaimer as to the ability of the operator to act as agent 
for the non-operators. However, Louisiana Civil Code article 2814 states 
that: "A provision that a partner is not a mandatary does not affect third 
persons who in good faith transact business with the partner." It would 
appear that the agreement, specifically denying the existence of agency, if 
properly recorded, would take care of both the mandate and apparent 
authority issues both by virtue of the provisions of Mineral Code article 
215, negating partnership, and the "good faith" requirement of article 2814, 
because good faith could not be argued in view of the existence of 
a 
properly recorded joint operating agreement. The reason that these 
provisions are important is that in the event of insolvency of the operator,
there will often be an attempt to hold the non-operators liable for the debts 
contracted by the operator. It would appear that absent an affirmative act on 
the part of the non-operator which would suggest responsibility, the non-
operators should not be personally liable for those debts. 
For the same reasons as it serves to protect against third party 
liabilities, Mineral Code article 215 should also prevent those fiduciary 
obligation claims between the participants that have arisen from time to 
time in Louisiana, which we discussed earlier and which have been 
successful in other states. See e.g., TXO v. Hawkins Oil & Gas, Inc., 668 
S.W.2d 16 (Ark. 1984). 
The Stipulated Gross-Negligence Standard 
At law, the naturally applying standardwould be normal negligence, 
but the gross negligence stipulation, if effective, would change the standard. 
By implication, Louisiana Civil Code article 2004 allows such a change in 
the standard. That article provides: "Any clause is null that, in advance, 
excludes or limits the liability ofone party for intentional or gross fault that 
causes damage to the other party." Article 2004 does not permit absolution 
from gross fault, but clearly permits the raising ofthe standard of liability to 
gross fault or intentional misconduct. 
Massey v. DeccaDrillingCompany,Inc., 647 So.2d 1196 (La. App. 2d 
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Cir.) writ denied,653 So.2d 563 (1995), addresses the application of Article 
2004. There, an operator hired an investors' drilling company to drill an 
earning well under a series of farmouts. Massey, the operator, did not like 
the progress of the drilling and stopped the well short of its intended depth,
whereupon a disgruntled employee of the driller threw tools and junk down 
the hole. The well was cleaned up at a cost of $44,000 and produced about 
9,500 barrels of oil, but liens were filed and the well was plugged. A jury 
found that the plaintiff had been damaged by the drilling company in the 
amount of nineteen million dollars; most of which was lost mineral 
production. In order to find that Decca was responsible, the court had to do 
two things. First, it had to negate the consequential damages provision 
of 
the drilling contract, and second, it had to find Decca responsible for the 
intentional act of its employee. The court did both. It found that Decca was 
vicariously liable for its employee's intentional tort and that the 
consequential damages limitation did not apply because of Article 2004. 
The case is very troubling from the standpoint ofcontrolling exposure 
to the joint account. What would be the result 
if 
an operator's employee 
destroyed equipment? Presumably, this would be one instance in which the 
operator would be responsible for those actions and liable to the non-
operators. Outside of the context of this subject matter, the case is as 
troubling from the standpoint of proof of what had to be the most 
speculative of damages. It's inconceivable that a well produced 9,500 
barrels of oil before being plugged could be shown to have, more likely 
than not, produced minerals valued at over sixteen million dollars to the 
farmoutee. 
Tort Immunity for Non-Operators 
In recent years, personal injury plaintiffs in oilfield cases have 
sometimes pursued the non-operating interests. These cases have generally 
failed. In those cases arising in the Outer Continental Shelf, courts have 
generally held that the joint operating interests constitute a "joint venture" 
for purposes of the Longshore and Harbor Worker's Compensation Act (the 
"LHWCA"), the compensation scheme that generally governs mineral 
operations on the Shelf, and have held that the non-operators, as "joint 
venturers," are immune under the LHWCA. See, e.g., Heavin 
v.
Mobil Oil 
ExplorationandProducingSoutheast,Inc., 913 F.2d 178 (5th Cir. 1990); 
Davidson
v. Enstar 
Corp., 860 F.2d 167 (5th Cir. 1988). The irony of the 
non-operators arguing that they were joint venturers for the purposes of the 
LHWCA, but could not be held liable as joint venturers otherwise, has been 
frequently challenged. However, the federal courts, as in Heavin and 
Davidson,have routinely held that despite a stipulation to the effect that no 
partnership or joint venture exists, and despite the dictates of LSA-R.S. 
31:215, the substance of the relationship and dictates that the operating 
agreement creates a joint venture for the purposes of LHWCA. In non-
Shelf cases, courts have immunized the non-operators under the Louisiana 
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worker's compensation law because those non-operators were considered 
"statutory employers." See, e.g., Rosskamp v. PhillipsPetroleumCo., 992 
F.2d 557, 558-59 (5th Cir. 1993). Recent legislative action may, however, 
have partially eroded the statutory employment defense under standard 
operating agreements. 
In Act 315 of the 1997 session, the legislature limited the statutory 
employer defense somewhat. Under the revision, a defendant cannot take 
advantage of the "trade, business, or occupation" theory of statutory 
employment 
--
a theory typically relied upon by non-operators --"unless 
there is a written contract between the principal and a contractor which is 
the employee's immediate employer or his statutory employer, which 
recognizes the principal as a statutory employer." In other words, to use the 
broadest form of the statutory employer defense, the joint operating 
agreement must recognize the non-operators as the statutory employer 
of 
the operator's employees. This may turn out to be a small problem, 
however, as the available tort theories against non-operators [e.g. strict 
liability] have also been limited in recent legislative actions. Nonetheless, 
it 
may be wise to include the "statutory employer" declaration in the operating 
agreement in order to protect non-operators against suits by the operator's 
employees. 
Withdrawal and Removal of Operator 
Section V(B) provides for the resignation or removal of Operator and 
selection of successor. It states that the operator can resign at any time 
by 
giving written notice to the non-operators, but it further provides that the 
resignation will not be effective for ninety (90) days. The significance of 
the timing ofthe withdrawal of an operator was underscored in the case 
of 
Lancasterv. PetroleumCorp.ofDelaware,491 So.2d 768 (La. App. 3d Cir. 
1986). There, Petroleum was an operator of a well that blew out during 
drilling. Petroleum recommended the plugging and abandonment f the 
well, and as evidence of its conviction in its recommendation, resigned and 
threatened to plug the well that day unless another operator took over that 
day. Lancaster found another operator by agreeing to give the substitute 
operator a substantial portion of his back-in interest. The court found that 
Petroleum had breached the operating agreement by failing to honor the 
ninety (90) day notice of resignation provision"o and awarded damages 
based upon the rights that were given up to the entice the new operator into 
taking over operations. This case seems to suggest that with a breach of the 
express provisions of an operating agreement, the gross negligence standard 
contained in Article V will not apply. 
In addition to the provisions containing the procedure for voluntary 
10 Arguably, the withdrawal would have been actionable even absent a specific ninety-
day notice provision. See Tabco Exploration,Inc. v. Tadlock Pipe & Equipment,Inc., 617 
So.2d 606 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1993). 
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withdrawal of an operator, Section V(B) also provides the procedure by 
which an operator may be removed by the other non-operators. This 
procedure requires 
(1) 
good cause; (2) an affirmative vote of the non-
operators who own the majority interest remaining if the operator's interest 
is excluded; 
(3)
delivery of notice of the vote and the written notice ofany 
alleged default, and 
a
period of time within which to cure the default, either 
thirty (30) days or forty-eight (48) hours depending on whether or not the 
default concerns operations then being conducted. The operator can then be 
removed by vote in the event ofa failure to cure the default. "Good cause," 
as defined in the agreement, means gross negligence, willful misconduct, or 
a material breach of or an inability to meet the standards of good and 
workmanlike performance set forth in the agreement. Thus, while the 
mechanism for removal of an operator is available, it will be difficult 
to 
remove the operator. Assuming, as one must, that the operator will not 
agree that it has performed badly or has failed to cure any default 
in 
performance, there is no remedy available for removal of the operator 
outside of litigation. Even in the context of litigation, the existence of those 
required specific notices, non-compliance and proof of valid cause will 
constitute formidable obstacles to removing the operator. 
In the event of the resignation or removal ofan operator, Section V(B) 
establishes a procedure to determine how a successor operator will be 
selected. The successor operator shall be selected from the parties owning 
an interest at the time that the successor operator is selected. The operator 
"shall be selected by an affirmative vote of two 
(2)
ormorepartiesowning 
a majority interest,as shown in Exhibit A." In this vote, the operator is not 
entitled to vote for itself. This clause apparently does not provide a remedy 
in the event that less than two parties remain once the operator is excluded. 
However, that is apparently covered by the subsequent clause which 
provides that 
if 
the former operator does not vote or votes to reinstate itself, 
"the successor operator shall be selected by the affirmative vote of the party 




remaining after excluding the voting interest of the operator that 
was removed or resigned." So, if there are only two parties to an operating 
agreement, and one is operator, the remaining party (whether or not 
a 
majority interest owner) may vote to appoint itself operator. Similarly, with 
multiple parties, those parties may elect an operator even through they do 
not own an actual majority interest when the ownership interest of the 
operator is considered. 
Section V(B) also addresses the rights and duties of the operators, how 
the operator is bound to obtain competitive rates, discharge expenses, 
protect from liens, and hold the money for the account of non-operators 
separate from its own. It also provides that the operator shall provide cost 
estimates for operations, shall keep the non-operators advised as to 
operations, and shall provide insurance for the joint account. These 
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provisions, while self-explanatory, are mandatory, and the failure of the 
operator to comply can make it liable to the non-operators for errors or non-
performance. See ForestOil Corp. v. SuperiorOilCo., 338 So.2d 758 (La. 
App. 4th Cir. 1976). 
Correlative Duties of the Participants 
Finally, Estis v. Monte CarloExploration, Inc., 558 So.2d 341 (La. 
App. 3d Cir.), cert. denied, 563 So.2d 879 (1990), involved a case in which 
the Plaintiff lessor was awarded lease cancellation because the ninety (90) 
day drilling clause was not satisfied. The lessee sought to hold the operator 
liable. The standard applied by the court was that of a reasonable and 
prudent operator. It turns out that the lease expired because the Office of 
Conservation would not let the operator sell oil until certain operational 
improvements were done. The court found that because the operator was 
not provided sufficient funds from the non-operators to perform the 
services, the operator could not held responsible for the resulting loss. The 
sum and substance here is that the obligations are reciprocal between the 
operators and the non-operators. 
F. Article VI - "Drilling and Development" 
Article VI discusses the initial well under the agreement and the 
deadline for drilling. It establishes that the first well is mandatory, then 
attempts to cover all of the situations of subsequent operations after the 
initial well's completion, reworking, plugging back, other operations, or 
well abandonment. It also provides a procedure with respect to subsequent 
wells under which may choose to participate or may decline to participate in 
operations beyond the drilling of the initial well. 
Elections 
The protocol after the first well is drilled is that any of the parties will 
be allowed to propose additional operations, whether it be drilling, 
reworking, recompleting or plugging the well. Thereafter, the other 
participants are required to elect to participate or not to participate in the 
operation within a time frame established by the agreement, which 
is 
generally forty-eight (48) hours ifa rig is on location, and thirty (30) days 
if not. The failure to respond will constitute an election not to participate. 
A notice shall be written and shall give the parties with an interest under the 
agreement details on the 
(1)
work to be performed; (2) the location; (3) the 
proposed depth; (4) the objective horizon; and, 
(5)
the estimated cost of the 
operation. This section states that non-consenting parties shall not have to 
pay for any part of the operation, but shall have no. interest in the operation 
until certain percentages subject to selection by the participants to the 
agreement have been paid. 
The election clauses raises the question of how detailed the proposal 
for subsequent operations must be and how stringent the courts will be 
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illustrative. What the cases generally reveal is that the courts will not honor 
form over substance, and that they will treat these procedures as strictly as 
the parties do. The first case is J-O'B OperatingCo. v. Newmont Oil Co., 
560 So.2d 852 (La. App. 3d Cir.), cert.denied,565 So.2d 449 (1990). The 
case involved what appeared to be an operating agreement with Area of 
Mutual Interest ("AMI") language that allowed the participants, by election, 
to share in leases acquired within the confines of the AMI upon paying 
a 
share of the costs. The agreement affected state lands under lease to 
Texaco. Newmont had apparently committed at least verbally to both the 
State Mineral Board and to Texaco that it would conduct seismic operations 
as partial consideration for the sublease from Texaco, and for the State's 
deferral of further development on the lease. 
Under the operating agreement, the participants, including J-O'B, had 
the right to participate in any sublease upon agreement to pay acquisition 
costs within 15 days of receipt of notice of the acquisition and its cost. 
Newmont offered the sublease based upon reimbursement ofseismic costs 
and other expenses. J-O'B agreed to pay all expenses, other than seismic 
costs, which were substantial. Newmont took the position thereafter that 
J-
O'B had waived its right to participate and proceeded with its plans to drill 
on the farmout acreage. Apparently because ofthe view that J-O'B did not 
participate in the acreage, J-O'B was not offered an election to participate 
in 
the well. 
Trial was held after the well was drilled, and the trial court held that 
J-
O'B was entitled to participate in the well, but because the seismic work 
was a part of the acquisition cost, J-O'B had to pay its share. The court of 
appeal reversed, holding that the agreement did not allow an electing party 
"the right to contest the necessity for or the extent ofany consideration paid 
by the acquirer for a lease .... Newmont had no obligation to structure the 
agreement so as to satisfy any AMI party, its only obligation being to offer 
participation on the terms finally agreed upon." Id.at 859. The court went 
further: 
Although unnecessary to our decision, we consider that an obvious 
inequity would result were we to decide otherwise. As a result of the 
equivocal responses from appellees 
. 
. . Newmont, together with the 
AMI parties who agreed to bear the acquisition cost ... shouldered the 
entire burden 
... 
Appellees who bore neither the expense nor the risk 
of the venture now seek to participate in the proceeds from a highly 
successful well. 
Id.at 860. The court was holding the parties to the letter of the agreement 
because of its perception of the risk/reward balance that drives the oil 
industry, and would not allow an equivocal election to constitute 
a 
retroactive acceptance after a successful well had been drilled. 
The decision in CrescentDrillingandDevelopment,Inc. v. Sealexco, 
Inc., 570 So.2d 151 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1990), cert.denied, 575 So.2d 373 
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(1991), also illustrates the courts' treatment of election provisions. The 
case involved, among other things, a claim that one of the non-operators 
had forfeited a mineral interest because it failed to tender a share of drilling 
costs. The court made the following observation about how the operator, 
Sealexco, managed the joint account: 
[T]he record reflects that matters between Sealexco and its operating 
partners ... were handled very loosely .... Further the record reflects 
that Sealexco, as a matter of practice, allowed its participants to make 
elections late, they were allowed to pay prospect fees and other 
obligations untimely, and were never penalized 
.... 
Ben Seale's 
obligation for his share of the cost of the . .. well, although perhaps 
tendered untimely, was accepted by Sealexco, utilized and never 
returned. 
Id.at 155. The obvious implication is that if the provisions of an agreement 
are notfollowed strictly, they will not be appliedstrictly by the courts. 
The decision in Acadienergy,Inc. v. McCordExplorationCompany, 
596 So.2d 1334 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1992), stands in contrast. There the 
parties entered into a drilling agreement and an ancillary operating 
agreement. Those agreements applied only to acreage unitized around the 
initial well drilled under the agreements. After an initial well was drilled by 
the operator, Acadienergy, a non-operator, Westover, proposed an 
additional well. Acadienergy responded that it did not like the location and 
would not participate. McCord then began corresponding with Westover 
about revising the well location. They apparently reached agreement and 
advised Acadienergy of the fact that they had "refined" the bottom hole 
location. Acadienergy requested detail on the "refinement," but the detail 
was never provided. In deciding that Acadienergy had not been given a 
proper election, and thus did not forfeit its rights to participate in the well 
which was already producing, the court noted the following requirements 
of 
a notice of a proposed operation: "As indicated by the terms of the 
Operating Agreement, there are five facts of which a party must be given 
written notice. These facts are the work to be performed, the location, the 
proposed depth, the objective formation, and the estimated cost of 
operation." Id.at 1342. Westover argued substantial compliance with these 
requirements, but the court of appeal found that because of the "refinement" 
of the bottom hole location and the refusal of Westover and McCord to 
provide information on it, the election provisions of the operating 
agreement were not complied with. Thus, Acadienergy was allowed to 
participate in the well. 
This result is a bit more harsh and less in keeping with the J-O'B 
Operatingdecision's deference to the risk/reward equities,. which would 
require an affirmative indication ofparticipation in the risk of the well prior 
to drilling. Perhaps the distinction is that the court was not convinced that 
Acadienergy was a potentially willing participant who was not given a fair 
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opportunity to participate, whereas J-O'B had been more direct in its refusal 
to agree to bear the necessary expenses to participate in the venture. 
Spacing 
Section VI(B)(7) of the AAPL Form 610-1989 provides that "no well 
shall be proposed to be drilled or Completed from a Zone in which a well 
located elsewhere on a Contract Area is producing, unless such well 
conforms to the then existing spacing pattern for such Zone." This is 
apparently a provision which is causing great controversy, as it would 
appear to prevent an alternate unit well and would prevent application of the 
consent provisions and non-consent penalties under the agreement. 
However, the designation by the Office of Conservation of the well as an 
alternate unit well may obviate this problem. 
Marketing Obligations 
Generally, the operator is under no obligation to take production and 
sell it for the account of the non-operator, but many times does. Several 
cases have addressed both the marketing obligation and gas balancing in the 
absence of an agreement. In the area of marketing obligations, courts are 
willing to honor the terms of the operating agreements insofar as the 
agreement might superimpose an obligation that protects the operator from 
more stringent liability standards. But the courts, however, are not 
consistent on the application of those liability standards. 
Grace-Cajun Oil Co. No. Two v. Damson Oil Corp., 897 F.2d 1364 
(5th Cir. 1990), involved a situation in which Damson acted as operator 
in 
marketing its own and Grace Cajun's gas. The operating agreement 
provided that Damson had "no liability as Operator to the other parties for 
losses sustained, or liabilities incurred, except such as may result from gross 
negligence or from breach of the provisions of this agreement." Id at 1366. 
Damson sold the gas to Louisiana Intrastate Gas Corporation ("LIG") at 
a 
NGPA § 102 price, which it was not entitled to absent the filing and 
approval of a well status application with the Louisiana Department of 
Natural Resources. Because the well status application was not filed, LIG 
recouped the difference between the § 103 price which it paid and the § 109 
price that Damson was entitled to in the absence of the application. Grace-
Cajun ultimately sued Damson for its loss. The court did not find 
gross negligence or 
a 
breach of the operating agreement, saying: "It is not 
necessary to resolve whether the district court applied an improper standard 
to its determination of Damson's liability under the operating agreement. 
The gas purchase contract clearly defines Damson's duty." Id. at 1367. 
The court was not impressed with Damson's argument that Grace-Cajun 
was not a party to the gas sales agreement with LIG, and found Damson 
liable for the difference between what was collected and what Grace-Cajun 
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The court's initial premise here was that under the operating 
agreement, Grace Cajun had the right either to market its own gas or to 
allow Damson, as operator, to market it. Clearly, this was production 
contemplated by the operating agreement and was a central part of that 
agreement. It is unfathomable that the court could not conclude that the gas 
here was produced and sold subject to the rights, grants and conditions of 
that agreement, and for that reason the court's refusal to analyze the 
decision under the standards set forth in the operating agreement is 
incorrect. 
In LL&E v. Unocal, 1997 WL 756597 (E.D. La.), LL&E had two 
separate relationships with Unocal. At Lake Pagie, LL&E had granted 
several mineral leases to Unocal. After demand, LL&E sued Unocal to 
collect for underpayments of royalties as a result of improper pricing of 
liquids, non-payment for reimbursed gathering charges and improper gas 
pricing because ofcertain settlements which Unocal had entered into which 
reduced the pricing Unocal had received for gas. Unocal counterclaimed 
for sums which it had paid to settle an oil pricing claim by the Department 
of Energy affecting the Caillou Island Oil Field. Unlike Lake Pagie, at 
Caillou Island, Unocal and LL&E were co-working interest owners of 
several state leases. The case is interesting and unique because it relates to 
a lessee/operator's marketing obligations under two different scenarios 
--
one involving a mineral lease and the other an operating agreement. 
With regard to the lease issue, the Court found as had been held 
in 
Freyv. Amoco, 603 So.2d 166 (La. 1992), that despite the lessee's duty to 
market, the lessee, Unocal, was prudent to renegotiate the gas sales contract 
during the gas sales crisis. The court made specific reference to the duty set 
forth in the mineral code, i.e. the prudent operator standard under Mineral 
Code article 122. 
With respect to the joint operating agreement, the court found that the 
rights and obligations governing the actions ofthe parties were contained 
in 
the two operating agreements at issue, which were identical. The operating 
agreements provided that Unocal had "exclusive control" over operations 
on the state leases. The agreements further provided that the operator was 
"free to exercise its own best 
judgment 
in conducting the operations." 
Under those agreements Unocal was to market production in the event that 
LL&E failed to do so and would be in full control of those operations. The 
issue was whether Unocal should have unitized certain wells in order to 
ensure higher pricing under Department of Energy rules in order to establish 
that the production could be classified as "new oil" under the regulations 
providing higher price incentives for such new oil. 
Despite the differing standards in the Grace-Cajun operating 
agreement (gross negligence or breach of agreement versus best judgment), 
the court found that "Unocal took on the same responsibilities as the 
operator in Graceand that the unitizing of the properties in question was 
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Unocal's responsibility." LL&E v. Unocal, 1997 WL 756597 (E.D. La.) at 
7. The court also found that Unocal chose to ignore the advice on whether 
to unitize because of concerns that the formation of units would provoke 
development demands resulting in the release of non-unitized acreage back 
to the State, as lessor. The court found that because Unocal was negligent 
in not unitizing the properties, it could not collect reimbursement against 
LL&E. Stated another way, the court apparently applied a negligence 
standard and ignored the "best judgment" standard written into the 
agreement. 
Well Costs 
The next area of discussion relates to operating agreement 
responsibilities only indirectly in that it deals with cost adjustments in the 
event that operations involving those leases subject to the provisions of the 
operating agreement are unitized with those not subject to any agreement. 
With regard to drilling wells not subject to reimbursement provisions of 
a 
joint operating agreement, problems generally arise when an operator drills 
a well into a unitized horizon or into one that is subsequently unitized and 
includes acreage not under lease to the joint interests. In those situations 
different rules apply depending upon whether or not the acreage is under 
lease to a third party or not subject to a mineral lease. LSA-R.S. 30:10. 
The "Risk Fee Bill" provides a mechanism by which the operator, on behalf 
of the joint account, can recover those costs incurred in the "drilling, 
testing, completing, equipping, and operating the unit well." The 
owner/driller can recover those expenses out of the non-participating 
owners share of production, as well as a charge for supervision, plus an 
additional "risk charge" of one hundred percent of the drilling and 
completion costs. 
There is a procedure developed to enable the operator to collect the 
risk charge. It requires notice, via certified mail, to others in the unit of the 
estimated cost of the well, its location, its proposed depth and logs and other 
non-public test data. The recipient of this information is then entitled to 
elect to participate that is, the recipient can agree to pay a share of the 
drilling cost. In the event that this information is not forwarded 
in 
accordance with the statute, the "risk charge" is unavailable. Similarly, 
in the event that the tract is not subject to a lease, the risk charge is similarly 
unavailable, but well costs are properly chargeable, subject to compliance 
with the dictates ofLSA-R.S. 103.2 requiring a detailed itemized statement 
of the cost of drilling, upon request by registered mail and the passage 
of 
ninety days from the formation of the unit. 
" 
11 The statute is viewed as punitive and therefore subject to strict construction. On this 
basis, it was held in Browning v. Exxon, 848 F. Supp. 1241 (M.D. La. 1994) that because the 
statute required certified mail, a notice by registered mail would not suffice. Thus, while the 
statute's 15 day response period is stringent, the court's application of it's punitive 
provisions is properly lenient. 
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The risk fee bill envisions a situation where one is drilling an undrilled 
unit or is drilling a substitute unit well, and thus knows the unit 
configuration and can ascertain the property ownership and leasehold 
situation, and can notify the non-participants. In those occasions in which 
the unit is not yet formed at the time that the well is drilled, and is not 
formed until after some production has accrued, an adjustment ofwell costs 
will be required. In that case, the non-participating owner is given the same 
election, with the same results, except that the chargeable costs are "reduced 
in the same proportion as the recoverable reserves in the unitized pool have 
been recovered by production." This same rule applies to units which are 
revised to include extra acreage not under lease to the operator, and the 
reverse applies, that is, credits are given to acreage that is excluded from a 
unit via a revision of the unit. The method applied effects a change in the 
law with respect to the method of achieving such an adjustment. 
Desormeaux v. Inexco Oil Co., 298 So.2d 897 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writ 
refused, 302 So.2d 37 (La. 1974), mandated a dollar for dollar method of 
reduction ofwell costs. This method was applied recently in the case of Tex 
Con OilandGas Co. v. Batchelor,634 So.2d 902 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1993), 
cert.denied,635 So.2d 1102 (1994). The "new" method added by Act No. 
595 of 1991, has been called the "unit ofproduction depreciated well cost 
method." Id. at 907. The former method provided a direct credit for 
revenues received for production, while the currently applicable method 
requires that the cost of the well be reduced in accordance with its loss of 
utility, so as to make the reduction commensurate with the lost value, and 
the costs due and owning relate to the future utility and value of the well. 
This statute explicitly does not apply to those situations in which written 
agreements deal with the same subject matter i.e., operating agreements. 
In Acadienergy,Inc. v. McCordExploration Co., supra, the drilling 
agreement was accompanied by an operating agreement, which provided for 
a set percentage contribution ofwell costs, subject to a well cost adjustment 
based upon voluntary or compulsory unitization affecting the initial well. 
The well was included in a Commissioner's unit, which was revised twice. 
The question was whether there would be subsequent adjustment upon unit 
revisions. The court found that the portion of the agreement providing for 
well cost adjustments was ambiguous, and construed it against the drafting 
party, Acadienergy. Further, the court found that, equitably, the parties' 
revenue interest did not increase with the unit revision, and therefore, 
neither should its well cost liability, and thus denied the request for an 
adjustment. 
Allocation 
of Production and Balancing 
With regard to production attributable to those within the unit who do 
not have an agreement with the operator, the applicable law varies 
depending upon whether the tract is leased or unleased. Unleased interest 
owners are entitled to a share of the proceeds from production attributable 
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to the tract's interest in production, for which the operator is liable. LSA-
R.S. 30:10(A)(3). The working interest owner under a mineral lease is 
entitled to receive production. In the event that the working interest owner 
does not take production as it is produced, it is now resolved that "in-kind" 
balancing is the norm. Hunt Oil Co. v. Batchelor, 644 So.2d 191 (La. 
1994). In the event that the well depletes before in-kind balancing can be 
done, a cash accounting by the operator is in order. The operator would 
then be forced to collect the overpayments to the non-operator caused by 
the imbalance. King v. Strohe, 673 So.2d 1329 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1996) 
suggests that these collection efforts could be governed by the doctrine of 
payment of a thing not owed, to the extent that no provision specifically 
permits collection from overbalanced parties after depletion. 
An under-produced party who has entered into a joint operating 
agreement which allows but does not require them to take production in-
kind, but have not entered into a gas balancing agreement would, according 
to the Louisiana Second Circuit Court of Appeal, be entitled to a cash 
balancing upon depletion. Ellwood Oil Co. v. Anderson, 655 So.2d 694 
(La. App. 2d Cir.), writ denied,661 So.2d 466 (1995). However, inAmoco 
ProductionCo. v. FinaOil & Chemical Co., 670 So.2d 502 (La. App. I st 
Cir.) writ denied,673 So.2d 1037 (1996), the First Circuit held that in the 
event that the parties had addressed balancing, but did not provide a method 
ofcorrecting imbalances upon depletion, there would be no cash balancing. 
The 1989 AAPL form contains language similar to that employed in the 
Ellwood case and would presumably call for the same result. 
G. Article VII 
-
"Liability of Parties" 
Article VII discusses liabilities of the parties and what happens in the 
event of default by parties. This section establishes that the liabilities shall 
be several and not joint or collective and then it restates the notion that 
"each party shall be responsible only for its obligations, and shall be liable 
only for its proportionate share of the costs ofdeveloping and operating the 
Contract Area." It goes on to say: 
[N]o party shall have any liability to third parties hereunder to satisfy 
the default of any other party in the payment of any expense or 
obligation hereunder. It is not the intention of the parties to create, nor 
shall this agreement be construed as creating, a mining or other 
partnership, joint venture, agency relationship or association, or to 
render the parties liable as partners, co-venturers, or principals. 
It also conveys that the parties are not fiduciaries with one another and 
thus are free to act in their own self interest "subject, however, to the 
obligations of the parties to act in good faith in their dealings with each 
other with respect to activities hereunder." 
Mutual Liens 
Section VII(B) is important in that it is the section which iterates the 
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liens and security interests purportedly granted by the operating agreement. 
In these days ofconstant reorganization and commitment to ever-changing 
strategic objectives by the larger companies, parties are called upon to deal 
with total strangers under operating agreements created by other parties. It 
is not unusual for a company to find itself at odds with another company not 
only in areas of operational philosophy, which creates problems in other 
areas, but also in the area of financial responsibility. If the operator has 
financial problems, the non-operators may face agency and partnership 
claims (previously discussed) as well as lien claims by creditors. As 
between the parties, the operators and non-operators liens have become 
important. 
We begin this area with the premise that liens may not be created by 
agreement between debtor and creditor unless there is a statute declaring 
that such a contract shall create a lien. Blasingame
v.
Anderson, 108 So.2d 
105, 236 La. 505 (La. 1959). Nevertheless, in Kenmore Oil Co. 
v. Delacroix,316 So.2d 468 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1975), the court recognized an 
operator's lien, noting that one was provided for in an operating agreement, 
but not otherwise defining the source. Since that time, operator's liens have 
become commonplace, with little analysis regarding their source. There 
have been various suggestions that the operator's lien was created by 
subrogation, because the operator paid the bills of the suppliers on behalf of 
the non-operator, which supplier was entitled to his own lien, or that it was 
granted by a broad reading of this statute. See Compadres,Inc. 
v.
Johnson 
Oiland Gas Corp., 547 So.2d 382 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1989). 
Those familiar with the various forms of operating agreements are 
aware that the form has always provided for an operator's lien, and many 
of 
the more modem forms grant a lien to the non-operator. It does not appear 
that any of the arguments advanced in favor of the operator's lien could 
even arguably support the non-operator's lien, as it could neither be 
supported by the legal subrogation theory nor the "broad language" of the 
old lien act. 
Fortunately, this problem was rectified by the passage of Act 1040 
in 
the 1997 Regular Session of the legislature, which established privileges 
in favor ofboth the operator and the non-operator. These statutory cross-liens 
are contained in LSA-R.S. 9:4881 et seq. Neither lien is dependent upon 
the existence of an agreement. This is established by the fact that 4881(2) 
defines a non-operator as "a lessee other than the operator," and 4881(3) 
defines the operator as "a lessee who is conducting operations with respect 
to a well." The fact that these in rem obligations are statute-based and not 
dependent upon any agreement raises issues relating to well costs, 
marketing and balancing. 
The operator, under 4882(A) is granted a privilege "to secure payment 
of all obligations incurred in the conduct of operations which the non-
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contrast, pursuant to 4882(B), the non-operator is given a privilege "to 
secure payment ofall obligations owed to him by the operator from the sale 
or other disposition ofhydrocarbons ofthe non-operator produced from the 
well." Thus, the operator obtains a lien covering all personal obligations, 
while the non-operator's lien only secures payments for production. 
Although, arguably, the claim for collection of the well costs is quasi-
contractual,12 presumably non-operators who do not provoke unitization are 
not "personally bound" to reimburse well and operating costs. " Thus, to 
the extent that the non-operator, without an agreement, is not personally 
bound, the operator does not obtain a lien on production. However, because 
the operator is allowed a direct recoupment from production, the lien may 
not be essential for collection ofdrilling or operating costs. 
The non-operator's reciprocal lien pertains to amounts "owed" to the 
non-operator from sale of hydrocarbons. At first glance, this provision 
would seem to strengthen the position ofthe non-operator in a unit who has 
no agreement with the operator. However, a closer look reveals that, 
because the non-operator is not due anything but an in-kind balancing, and 
the act only covers obligations owed, the lien is not granted in an under-
balanced situation. After depletion, the non-operator is entitled to a cash 
balancing, and LSA-R.S. 9:4883(6) gives the non-operator a lien on the 
proceeds received by, and obligations owed to the operator. This remedy 
would seem to prove somewhat thin given the narrow time frame that the 
"obligations owed" might exist, and the difficulty in tracking the liened 
"proceeds." The result that the lien is not as significant, ultimately, as the 
personal claim for a cash balancing. These issues point up to the fact that 
these reciprocal liens are best suited for application in connection with an 
operating agreement that establishes the "personal obligations," which give 
rise to the privilege. 
The lien granted by Section VII(B) of the operating agreement 
is 
similar to the statutory lien in that it is on the mineral leases, other interests, 
and personal property. Unlike the statutory lien, however, this privilege 
does not appear to be limited to operations in connection with any particular 
well, whereas the statutory lien has historically and is currently based upon 
operations on a particular well. It also appears to cover royalty and 
overriding royalty interests, which are excluded under the statutory lien. As 
a practical matter, however, one might question the wisdom of seizing 
royalty proceeds and placing the lease in jeopardy. 
12 The right to collect is based upon LSA-R.S. 30:10 and arguably constitute a "personal" 
obligation, similar to the operators quasi-contractual obligation to account to unleased 
owners. See Taylorv. Woodpecker Corp., 633 So.2d 1308, 1312-3 (La. App. 1stCir. 1994). 
13 The non-operating working interest owner is "personally" liable only in the event that 
he would "ratify and consent" to the drilling operations per SuperiorOilCo. v. Humble Oil 
& Refining Co., 165 So.2d 905 (La. App. 4th Cir.), cert. denied, 246 La. 842, 167 So 2d 668 
(1964); Davis OilCo. v. SteamboatPetroleumCorp., 583 So.2d 1139 (1991). 
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Third-party mortgagees of the interest owners may claim priority over 
the liens in the operating agreement. The lender will claim priority either 
because of the public records doctrine or because of the express ranking 
provisions of LSA-R.S. 9:4888. A recent decision from the Sixth Circuit, 
construing Louisiana law, addressed these issues. See In Re Century 
Offshore Management Corp., 119 F.3d 409 (6th Cir. 1997). In that case, 
the lending agreement was made "subject to" the operating agreement. The 
court strongly suggested that the mortgage would otherwise have primed 
the operating agreement's liens. But by making the mortgage "subject to" 
the operating agreement, the lender subordinated its security interest to 
those created by the operating agreement, even though the operating 
agreement was unrecorded. The result is the same without reliance upon 
the "subject to" language. The Fifth Circuit has held that a bank's 
otherwise superior mortgage interest and pledge of production must bear 
drilling costs attributable to the mortgagor, because the non-operator's 
interest was so limited. Grace Cajun Oil Co. No. 3 v. FederalDepositIns. 
Corp., 882 F.2d 1008 (5th Cir. 1989). The court's unstated logic, to the 
effect that the mortgagee's right to receive production proceeds is limited 
by what the mortgagor was entitled to, seems both equitable and rational. 
Other Non-Performance Remedies 
The operator does have the ability to demand advanced payment for 
the next month's expenses from the non-operators in anticipation of 
operations under Section VII(C). Thus, the operator does not have to fund 
operations for the benefit of the non-operators. This call for an advance 
would create an "obligation" under the liens clause, or an obligation 
incurred under the lien act and could allow an operator's lien to secure 
payment, but the timing is so tight as to make it impractical. 
Next, Section VII(D), "Defaults and Remedies," provides remedies in the 
event that one of the parties is in default of its obligations of the agreement. 
One option afforded the operator is the ability to call upon the other parties 
to make up that defaulting party's share, thus reducing the burden upon the 
operator. There is a subsection which provides that any party to the 
agreement can deliver to a party in default a notice of default and specify 
the actions required to cure the default. If not cured within thirty days, then 
"all of the rights of the defaulting party granting by this agreement may 
upon notice be suspended until default is cured." If the operator is the 
defaulting party then the operator who does not cure a default can be 
removed by a vote of the non-operators owning a majority interest. 
The rights suspended for the defaulting party include the right to 
receive information and to participate in operations, even those operations 
in which they are currently participating. The suspended rights also include 
the right to receive proceeds for production. PittencrieffResources,Inc. v. 
Firstland
Offshore 
ExplorationCo., 942 F. Supp. 271 (E.D. La. 1996) is a 
case dealing with an offshore platform and purportedly applying Alabama 
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law, although it is readily apparent that the choice of law selection was not 
outcome determinative. The result would have been the same under 
Louisiana law. The case involved an offshore exploration agreement which 
was not on a "standard" form, although its provisions, and the problems 
created, are not atypical. The operating agreement provided at Section 9.1 
that no well that had once produced could be abandoned without the 
consent of all parties owning an interest in the platform. Section VI(E)(2) 
of the AAPL Model Form 610-1989 has a similar provision. The 
agreements also have similar provisions regarding reimbursement for the 
abandonment costs net of salvage value. The issue presented revolved 
around the fact that Firstland had an desire to take over the platform and 
operate it, while Unocal and others wanted it abandoned. The operating 
agreement did allow any non-operator an election to take over the platform, 
in the event that abandonment was proposed. The concern, unexpressed in 
the opinion, was about Firstland's ability to conduct operations in such 
a manner as to not expose Unocal and other owners to additional exposure as 
a result of those operations, because Unocal could retain potential liability 
as a result ofFirstland's continued operations both to the MMS, as a former 
lease owner and operator, and to third parties, under some theory of pre-
transfer negligence. Section VI(E)(2) of the standard form contains 
language to the effect that the party taking over operations shall indemnify 
the former owners, but, as is evident, an indemnity is only as strong as the 
party providing it. It further provides that the party taking over operations 
shall prove their ability to "conduct operations" on the well, but again, the 
ability to "conduct operations" may not provide sufficient relief, in that 
it 
arguably did not require the demonstration ofan ability to stand the type 
of losses that can arise due to unforeseen environmental or other catastrophes 
which might occur in oilfield operations. 
Faced with the prospect ofgiving up its interest in a platform and wells 
and possibly retaining exposure, Unocal and several non-operators took the 
position that since no non-operator was current on its bills, no non-operator 
was entitled to participate in operations or vote. Inasmuch as the exercising 
the option to take over the platform and wells required an "election," the 
question became whether a party which could not vote, could nevertheless 
exercise an election to take over the platform. The court equated electing 
with voting and held that 
a 
party in default could not elect to take over the 
platform and wells. The court was initially concerned about the fact that the 
loss of voting rights would affect an unintended forfeiture of the parties' 
interest in the property. Ultimately, court concluded that the provisions 
preventing voting by a defaulted party were intended to limit rights, even 
if 
the effect was a forfeiture of property. 
It would appear that the limitations on the rights ofa party in default 
in 
Pittencrieffaresimilar to the restrictions contained in VIII(D)(1), that is, 
a party in default cannot receive information, cannot participate in Section 
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VI(B) operations, or in the right to receive proceeds. There is no limitation 
expressed as to voting on procedures other than those under Section VI(B), 
so it is an open question whether the standard form would allow a party in 
default to take over operations ofa well after an abandonment proposal. 
In any event, one would hope that the Section VI(E) language concerning the 
ability of the defaulting party to "conduct operations" would provide 
sufficient protection. 
Section VII(D) also contains an interesting provision that states that the 
non-defaulting parties can sue the defaulting parties or operator may sue 
a 
joint account expense to collect amounts due, and then provides "[n]othing 
herein shall prevent any party from suing any defaulting party to collect 
consequential damages accruing to such party as a result of the default." 
Part 
3
provides that the non-defaulting parties can eliminate the ability of a 
defaulting party to consent to any future operations. This cures the problem 
that had existed in the past under certain operating agreements in which 
a 
party might be in default, but might contractually consent to operations and 
take the chance of being bailed out by a good well. This b sically 
hampered the ability of the joint account to continue operating. Section 
VII(E) refers to payment of rentals and as discussed earlier, those rentals 
and these obligations are taken care of by the party who contributes the 
leases although the operator is bound to notify these parties when a rental 
might be due or shut-in type rental might be due. In the event the operator 
does not do that, the loss is shared by the joint account rather than borne by 
the contributing party. 
H. Article VIII -"Acquisition Maintenance or Transfer of Interest" 
Section A of Article VIII, entitled "Surrender of Leases," provides 
that: "the leases covered by this agreement, insofar as they embrace acreage 
in the contract area, shall not be surrendered in whole or in part unless all 
parties consent thereto." This section then goes on to establish a procedure 
of thirty (30) days notice by which parties notify another party of the 
potential surrender of leases. When the parties want to surrender, they must 
notify other parties, who have an opportunity to pick up those leases. This 
section also addresses assignment of the obligations under the leases and 
also an assignment of equipment and production. Under the agreement, the 
assigning party shall be relieved of further obligations, and the assignee 
shall pay the reasonable salvage value of the assignor's interest. Of course, 
the payment provisions are governed by the accounting procedures that 
establishes values. Part B governs renewals and extensions and how they 
will be owned. 
I. Articles IX-XVI 
The remainder of the operating agreement contains Article IX, 
"Internal Revenue Code Election." This section enables parties to create 
partnership for income tax purposes. Article X talks about how claims and 
lawsuits will be handled and gives the operator authority to settle disputes 
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up to a specified amount. It provides that the parties shall share an expense 
of any claims. Article XI, "Force Majeure," provides what happens if 
parties are prevented from operating for any unavoidable reason. Article 
XII deals with notices. Article XIII provides for the term of the agreement. 
Article XIV talks about laws, regulations, what laws will govern, and 
allows the parties to select the governing law. Article XV contains 
miscellaneous provisions, including how the agreement will be executed 
and its effect on successors and assigns. Article XVI is "Other Provisions" 
and allows the parties to create special conditions and provisions. 
J. Restrictions on Transfer 
Joint operating agreements commonly restrict transfer of interests 
covered by the agreement, typically through a preferential rights provision. 
Yet under a recent decision, FinaOil and Chemical Co. v. Amoco Prod. 
Co., 673 So.2d 668 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1996), cert.denied,679 So.2d 1353 
(1996), it may be possible, intentionally or otherwise, to circumvent these 
provisions. 
In this case, Amoco spun off a number of lease interests to MW, 
a 
newly formed and wholly owned subsidiary, as part of a reorganization. 
Amoco then sold all the stock of MW to Apache. Fina, a working interest 
owner in the three joint operating agreements involved, took exception, and 
sued Amoco. Fina contended that Amoco's action triggered the preferential 
right to purchase provisions. The court disagreed. It found that the transfer 
from Amoco to MW was part of a legitimate reorganization. Under 
standard agreements, where restrictions on transfer do exist, a transfer by
"merger, reorganization, consolidation" is exempt from the preferential 
rights provisions. As for the sale of stock by Amoco to Apache, the court 
found no restriction in stock transfers in the joint operating agreement. 
Accordingly, in effect, Amoco was allowed to transfer all of its interest 
in 
the joint operating agreement to another, unrelated party without triggering 
the preferential rights provisions. 
K. Prescription 
Arguably, because billings are rendered periodically on 
a 
revolving 
basis, the charges due under the operating agreement will be governed by 
the three year prescriptive period governing open accounts. However, that 
is not the case according to the jurisprudence, which holds that the ten (10) 
year period governing general contracts is applicable. Caddo v. O'Brien, 
908 F.2d 13 (5th Cir. 1990). 
III. Conclusion 
There is currently quite a bit more litigation over operating agreements 
and co-ownership issues than has historically existed. This trend is likely to 
continue given the lack of cohesiveness in the industry. The case law has 
indicated that an attempt will be made to honor the language and intent of 
those operating agreements, and actually encourages such agreements, 
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particularly to resolve theory issues like production allocation. Although 
the results of the court's decisions on these agreements are not always easy 
to reconcile, the courts will attempt to follow the intent of the parties to an 
agreement, and thus it behooves parties to enter into agreements fully 
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